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We analyze both the theoretical framework of labor taxation in the open economy 
and important current reforms of labor taxation in countries worldwide including the 
introduction of “social VAT”. The current tax theory considers the reforms of labor 
income taxation related to the shifting of taxation from more mobile tax bases to the 
less mobile ones, taking into consideration the reduction of tax rates with simultaneous 
broadening of the tax base. Such a reform is intended to reduce the distortion effects 
of taxation, and, as a consequence, to reduce the tax burden on labor. The empirical 
section includes analysis of indicators of labor income taxation in OECD countries. 
We calculated the progressivity index of overall tax wedge and its components – 
personal income tax, employer’s and employee’s social security contributions. The 
results enabled cross-country comparisons: we found that in a most OECD members 
both employees’ and employers’ social security contributions systems are regressive 
or flat, while personal income tax systems are progressive in all countries except 
Hungary with flat tax schedule. Moreover, in OECD countries with highest GDP per 
capita the employees bear average labor tax burden with simultaneously low 
employers’ social security contributions rates. 
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social VAT; progressivity.  
JEL Classification: E20, H22, H24, P51 
1. Introduction 
In modern economies, the tax burden on labor typically includes personal income 
taxes and social security contributions paid by both employers and employees. In most 
of countries worldwide the structure of personal income tax is quite complex (in 
contrast to social security contributions) and includes several tax brackets, different tax 
rates, tax incentives etc.  
Taxes on labor income have a direct impact on business activities influencing on 
both labor demand and labor supply levels, and indirect impact through government 
spending (based on tax revenue) related to the financing of provision of social goods 
and services.  
The taxation of labor leads to the reduction of employment in the formal sector of 
economy and consequently to the increase of employment in the informal sector, to the 
reduction of both output and employment in industries using primarily low-skilled and 
low-paid workforce, and also to the increase of domestically produced output, i.e. 
goods and services, produced and consumed in the household without being distributed 
by market channels.  
The openness of the economy leads to the new challenges, related to the 
international tax competition and tax incidence, which often aggravate the problem of 
shifting the corporate tax burden on labor. These issues are particularly topical for the 
small open economy with no competitive power in international markets.  
The mentioned problems and their consequences reduce economic efficiency of 
labor taxation. The tax distortions violate basic principles of equity and neutrality and 
slow down economic growth. The progressivity of taxation allows to come close to the 
achieving the equity principle, but it simultaneously violates the neutrality. In turn, 
consumption tax with broader base and uniform rate makes possible to maintain some 
degree of neutrality, but with simultaneous failure of equity principle.  
So, today the reforms of labor taxation, aimed to address these distortions and to 
ensure the effective distribution of resources, are actively discussed in societies. 
Accordingly, the purpose of the paper is to evaluate main indicators of labor 
taxation and the progressivity of tax wedge and its components in OECD countries.  
The article is structured as follows. First, we briefly discuss the theoretical 
background of labor income taxation in an open economy and main current trends of 
labor taxation reforms. The empirical part includes analysis of indicators of labor 
income taxation in OECD countries. Notably, Section 2 presents material and 
methodology, and Section 3 describes results and discussion. Section 4 concludes.  
2. Material and Methods 
For today, the economy of almost all countries worldwide more or less can be 
considered as open – goods and services, capital and labor move across the borders.  
According to the tax theory, for the small open economy the source‐based capital 
tax, taking into account the perfect mobility of capital and immobility of labor, would 
never be optimal, because the small economy have no market power to change the rate 
of return of its residents or other capital owners, in other jurisdictions. In this case, the 
tax burden falls entirely on the immobile labor [1; 8]. 
Taking this into consideration the taxation of labor income of employers is more 
effective. Moreover, the higher is the degree of market integration, the more the rate of 
employment depends on tax changes [2; 4; 5; 7]. 
The strengthening or weakening the government’s role as the guarantor of risk 
minimization in the open economy depends crucially on the level of labor mobility. 
And, since the labor mobility increases permanently, such function of the government 
tends to weaken [19, p. 28-31]. 
The current tax theory considers two main directions of reforms of labor income 
taxation: 
the shifting the burden of taxation from income to consumption and/or property, 
and  
the broadening of the tax base by reducing tax rates and by eliminating main tax 
incentives.  
In the context of labor taxation, it means the reduction of tax burden borne by 
labor in order to increase employment and enhance economic growth.  
Basic arguments in favor of such tax reform in an open economy include the 
following. Shifting taxes from labor to consumption can generate the same revenue 
with lower tax rates and lower distortions since the latter is financed by a number of 
sources other than labor income – intergovernmental transfers, savings etc. In addition, 
the openness of the economy means the lower mobility of labor income comparing 
with corporate income since workforce overall is less mobile than capital [16].  
At the same time, the main consumption tax (the VAT) has relatively immobile 
tax base because it is levied according to the destination principle [3; 6]. This makes 
its base even less mobile than the labor income, quite apart from real estate, which is 
the least influenced by globalization processes. 
Accordingly, the VAT is the main “alternative” of labor taxes due to its large tax 
base, and the increase in VAT rate is considered as the major component of tax reform. 
It is referred to the so-called “social VAT”, which partially replaced social security 
contributions in several countries (Table 1.). 
Table 1. “Social” VAT in OECD countries (Source: author, based 9; 10; 12). 
Country Year of 
introduction 
Key features 
Denmark 1987 2% increase in VAT rate for (to 21%) with simultaneous 




1994 The reduction of social security contributions rate, paid by 
employers, with simultaneous increase in VAT rate from 
7,5% to 9,5%. 
Germany 2007 3% increase in VAT rate (to 19%) with simultaneous 1,8% 
reduction in employers’ social security contributions rate 
Hungary 2009 5% increase in VAT rate (to 27%) with simultaneous 5% 
reduction in employers’ social security contributions rate 
(to 22%) 
Japan 2014 5% increase in consumption tax rate (to 8%) with 
simultaneous abolishment of compulsory social security 






The discussion was started, but currently there are no 
concrete results on this issue  
 
The consequences of introduction of “social” VAT in countries with progressive 
and flat schedules of labor income tax are usually evaluated with macroeconomic 
simulation models. Their results show positive effects in the medium-term (the increase 
of demand on labor due to reduced labor costs), despite the short-term negative effects 
as a result of increase in consumer prices subsequent to the increase in VAT rate.  
Also in an open economy, there are several positive effects on the competitiveness 
of domestic producers on both domestic and foreign markets, especially with fixed 
exchange rate. They benefit in the domestic market, since importers pay the increased 
VAT, without any gain from reduced labor costs. The domestic exporters also increase 
their competitiveness in foreign markets due to reduced labor costs.  
However, the effects of introduction of “social” VAT both for progressive and 
flat tax schedules depend crucially on model assumptions and on economic and 
institutional environment of the country. Notably, the evaluation of such a reform in 
Hungary, which has flat schedules of labor income taxation (see below), is substantially 
complicated by consequences of global financial crisis 2008-2009, by decisions of 
national government, and by presence of informal economy. The latter means that 
administrative costs and possibilities for tax evasion differ for consumption taxes and 
labor income taxes [13, p. 26-27].  
Now in USA the House Tax Cuts and Jobs Act is actively debated. It is a kind of 
a revenue neutral tax plan aimed to reduce personal income tax rates for middle-income 
groups, to raise the consumption tax, and to expand the Earned Income Tax Credit. 
According to estimates, such measures can contribute to economic growth [11; 18]. 
In terms of progressivity, such a reform involves reduction of progressivity of 
labor income taxation and reduction of its marginal rates, especially for higher tax 
brackets. In OECD countries the sum of personal income tax, levied by different levels 
of government (state, provincial, cantonal, or local), employee and employer social 
security contributions and payroll tax less cash transfers, if any, determines the tax 
wedge, which is usually expressed as a percentage of labor cost.  
Therefore, to evaluate the progressivity of tax wedge and its components in OECD 
countries we used comparative and graphical analysis.  
The relevant quantitative analysis is based on data for OECD countries over the 
period for 2000-2016, provided by OECD Statistics.  
3. Results and Discussion 
Over the last three decades, OECD countries provided more than 3000 reforms, 
related to the labor income taxation. Their largest part addressed personal income 
taxation. Italy and Ireland provided maximum number of such transformations – 121 
and 199 respectively, while Austria put in practice only 14. 
The number of reforms related to the employers’ social security contributions 
exceeded more than 1,5 times the quantity of reforms associated with employees’ 
social security contribution. Whereas, with regard to social security contributions rate, 
the majority of reforms increased it for employers’ social security contributions, and 
reduced – for employees’ social security contributions. 
According to OECD Taxing Wages 2017 now the maximum tax wedge is in 
Belgium (53,96%), while the minimum – in New Zealand (17,89%). But in New 
Zealand there are no compulsory levies on social security, only voluntary, paid by both 
employers and employees, which are not reflected in OECD official statistic reports. 
Employers in Denmark have similar possibility to pay social contributions to the 
unemployment fund voluntarily.  
 






Figure 1. Main indicators of labor income taxation in OECD countries for 2000-
2016 (Source: author, based on 14; 15). 
 
 
Note: henceforth we use indicators based on a single person at 100% of average 
earnings, with no child; 
SSC – social security contributions.  
As one can see on Fig.1., during 2000-2016 there is no important change in both 
PIT rates and social security contributions rates in OECD countries. The insignificant 
reduction of indicators relates to the remedial actions to overcome 2008‐2010 
economic downturn. 
According to the EC Report, the tax policy responses in the area of labor income 
taxation include: 
a temporary increase in transfers to the unemployed or low income households; 
a temporary lengthening of the duration of unemployment benefit; 
temporary reductions of the standard VAT rate; 
a reduction of social contributions paid by employers on low-skilled low-paid 
employees in order to promote their employability; 
the removal of the requirement for micro‐enterprises to submit annual accounts 
[19]. 
 
Fig. 2. illustrates comparison between some indicators of labor income taxation 
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Figure 2. Indicators of labor income taxation in OECD countries, 2016 (Source: 





As one can see on Fig. 2, in 2016 the highest social security contributions rate, 
paid by employers, was in France, while the lowest – in Denmark and Israel. The 
maximum tax wedge was in Belgium and Germany, and the minimum was in Mexico 
and Korea. 
However, the countries with highest GDP per capita (between OECD states) are 
grouped together at the bottom of Fig. 2. In terms of labor income taxation it could be 
evidence that in the richest OECD countries employees bear average tax burden with 
simultaneously low social security contributions rates paid by employers. 
In general, the reforming of labor income taxation in most of OECD countries 
aimed not only to shift the tax burden on consumption, but also to reduce both the 
degree of progressivity of labor income taxes, and their marginal rates, especially, for 
higher tax brackets.  
To estimate the level of progressivity of labor taxation in OECD countries we 
calculated the progressivity index of labor income taxation for OECD countries for 
2016. We estimated the progressivity of tax wedge components: personal income tax, 




For this, we used the following formula: 






)                (1)  𝑁𝑖=1 ,  
where 𝑀𝐸𝑇𝑅 is the marginal tax rate; 
𝐴𝐸𝑇𝑅 is the average tax rate, i.e. the share of tax burden in the taxpayer’s gross 
labor income; 
𝑁 are levels of labor income (50%-250% of the average workers income); 
𝑁 =  201, 𝑖 =  1 …  𝑁 [17]. 
Table 2. presents the results of calculation. 
Table 2. Progressivity index for the tax wedge and its components in OECD 







Overall tax wedge 
Austria 0,69 0,53 1,28 1,07 
Belgium 1,03 1,13 1,39 1,23 
Canada 0,55 0,32 1,45 1,24 
Czech Republic 1 1 1,26 1,11 
Estonia 1 1 1,25 1,08 
Finland 1 1,02 1,47 1,27 
France 1,18 0,90 1,33 1,20 
Germany 0,44 0,43 1,15 1,03 
Greece 1 1 1,52 1,28 
Hungary 1 1 1 1 
Ireland 1,03 0,997 2,16 1,64 
Israel 1,27 1,42 1,85 1,69 
Italy 1 1,04 1,49 1,23 
Japan 0,74 0,72 1,25 1,10 
Korea 0,79 0,73 1,49 1,25 
Luxembourg 0,77 0,82 1,40 1,26 
Mexico 0,72 1,16 3,36 1,33 
Netherlands 0,29 0,52 1,49 1,32 
Norway 1 1 1,35 1,24 
Poland 1 1 1,14 1,08 
Portugal 1 1 1,60 1,29 
Slovakia 1,03 1,03 1,29 1,14 
Slovenia 1 1 1,34 1,23 
Spain 0,57 0,57 1,52 1,099 
Sweden 1 0,31 1,52 1,27 
Switzerland 0,97 0,97 1,48 1,36 
Turkey 1 1 1,26 1,16 
UK 1,21 0,64 1,45 1,35 
USA 0,84 0,91 1,28 1,195 
OECD average 0,93 0,89 1,37 1,22 
The results allowed us to determine the following current trends in taxation of 
labor income in OECD countries: 
in most of OECD countries the schedule of social security contributions, paid by 
employer, is regressive (11 countries) or flat (12 countries); 
the schedule of social security contributions, paid by employee, in most OECD 
countries is regressive (14 countries) or flat (9 countries); 
the schedule of personal income tax is progressive in all OECD countries except 
Hungary, where this schedule is flat.  
The Israeli labor income tax system is found to be the most progressive system 
overall (1,69) as well as social security contributions system – 1,27 for social security 
contributions, paid by employer, and 1,42 – for social security contributions, paid by 
employee. Mexico stands out with a very progressive schedule of personal income tax 
(3,36), exceeding 3 times the OECD average. At the same time, country has the 33rd 
lowest tax wedge among the 35 OECD members – the average single worker in Mexico 
faces a tax wedge of 20,1% compared with the OECD average of 36,0%. Ireland 
occupies the 2nd place on the level of progressivity of personal income tax – 2,16. For 
other OECD countries, the progressivity index for personal income tax falls within 1 
and 2; the less progressive personal income tax schedules are in Poland (1,14) and 
Germany (1,15). 
The less progressive systems of social security contributions are in Netherlands – 
0,29 for social security contributions paid by employer and Sweden – 0,31 for social 
security contributions paid by employee. In general, OECD countries have regressive 
schedules of social security contributions paid by employer and employees – 0,93 and 
0,89 respectively, while the schedule of personal income tax is progressive (1,37). 
4. Conclusion  
The developed countries worldwide are actively discussing two main direction of 
reforms of labor income taxation: 
the shifting of taxation from more mobile tax bases to the less mobile ones, 
notably, from taxation of income to taxation of consumption and/or property; 
the reduction of tax rates with simultaneous broadening of the tax base. 
In general, according to the current tax theory, the switching from income to 
consumption taxes (with no impact on tax revenue), is intended to reduce the tax burden 
on labor in order to increase the employment and economic growth. 
But in practice, the government’s fiscal policy faces a number of challenges 
caused by openness of the economy, which means the lower mobility of labor income 
comparing with corporate income since workforce overall is less mobile than capital. 
The mentioned problems relate, particularly, the possibilities of shifting of the 
corporate income tax burden onto labor. In terms of labor supply, the income tax is 
considered as distortive, because it discourage individuals’ economic activity and leads 
to the reduction of number of working hours. However, consumption taxes have similar 
impact on labor supply, by reducing the real wage. Nevertheless, due to their broader 
tax base and their “proportionality” they are less distortive for achieving the same level 
of income (compared to labor income taxes). 
When government is concerned about social equity and distribution purposes, 
such a reform should include the reduction of the tax rate at the same value for each 
tax bracket on order to maintain the progressivity of the tax system. 
The empirical section includes analysis of indicators of labor income taxation in 
OECD countries. Notably the graphical analysis showed that in countries with highest 
GDP per capita, workers bear average labor tax burden (personal income tax plus 
employee’s social security contributions) accompanied simultaneously by low 
employer’ social security contributions rates. We calculated the progressivity index of 
labor income taxation for OECD countries for 2016; we estimated the overall tax 
wedge and its components: personal income tax, employer’s and employee’s social 
security contributions separately. For this we used the data for a basic household type 
– single person at 100% of average earnings (average workers wage), without children, 
provided by OECD statistics. The results enabled cross-country comparisons of 
progressivity of tax wedge and its components in OECD countries. In particular, our 
results showed that in most OECD countries the schedules of employers’ and 
employees social security contributions are regressive of flat, while schedule of 
personal income tax rate is progressive in all countries, except Hungary with flat tax 
schedule. 
The calculation and analysis of tax wedge using the time series data for OECD 
countries will allow to estimate the progressivity of schedules of labor income taxation 
in more detail, so that will be the topic for the future work. 
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